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KALVEN, JR.
THE REASONABLE MAN AND
THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
HILL, BUTTS, AND WALKER
While I agree with the results announced by Mr. Justice Har-
lan in both of these cases, I find myself in disagreement with
his stated reasons for reaching those results. Our difference
stems from his departure from the teaching of New York
Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), to which we both
subscribed only three years ago.'
I. TmrEn
Since March, 1964, when the United States Supreme Court
handed down its decision in New York Times v. Sullivan,2 there has
been much speculation about what would happen next. Would the
Court take seriously the new idiom and work a general revolution
in the thinking about the First Amendment? Or would it limit the
new principles and rhetoric to cases involving libel of public officials
and simply add one more special cluster of precedents to the many
it had already created in the free speech area? 3 Whatever their view
Harry Kalven, Jr., is Professor of Law, The University of Chicago.
I Chief Justice Warren, concurring, in Curds Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130
(1967).
2 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
3 This, for example, was the question on which I ended in Kalven, The New York
Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Su-
PRnr.m CounR REvmw 191, 221.
See also Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
HARRY
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of the New York Times case, students of the Court were all deeply
curious to see if, and how, it would grow. In the three intervening
years, the law reports, state and federal,4 have been rich in what Mr.
Justice Harlan has called "New York Times... and its progeny."'
After a few skirmishes with the Times rule,0 in the 1966 Term, the
First Amendment, 79 HAtv. L. REV. 1 (1965); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and
the Law of Libel; The Modern Revised Translation, 49 CoRNFIL L.Q. 581 (1964);
Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times v. Sullivan, 43
N.C. L. REv. 315 (1965); Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-a New Consti-
tutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REv. 1 (1965); Meiklejohn, Public Speech and the First
Amendment, 55 GEo. L. J. 234 (1966); Karst, The First Amendment and Harry
Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1965); and cf. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of
Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STA€. L. REV. 789 (1964).
4 The cases are collected in Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649
(D.C. Cir. 1966); Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir.
1966); and in the Court's footnote in Butts, 388 U.S. at 134 n. 1.
5 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 407 (1967).
6 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965);
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966); and see also Linn v. Plant Guard Workers,
383 U.S. 53 (1966). The cases appear more interesting in retrospect now that Hill,
Butts, and Walker have come down than they did at the time.
For present purposes it is sufficient to note that Garrison involved criminal libel
of judges who were unquestionably public officials, although the attack could be said
to have concerned their private lives, and that the conviction was upset. The Court
held that the New York Times principle applied to the crime of libel and reiterated
that something more than "mere negligence" was required to convict, namely,
knowing falsehood or reckless disregard for the truth.
In Rosenblatt, the statement in question was an oblique comment in a local news-
paper column allegedly referring to and defaming the plaintiff, the former supervisor
of a municipal ski resort. The case had been tried prior to the decision in New York
Times and the Court reversed and remanded plaintiff's libel judgment for a new trial.
The Court indicated that if the plaintiff were a public official, it was an error not
to have applied the New York Times standard to the defendant. There was a strong
implication that New York Times would not be relevant and the matter no longer of
constitutional concern, if plaintiff were not a public official. It was this implication
that is the most interesting point in Rosenblatt in view of the development in Butts
and Walker of the concept of the "public figure."
The opinions in both cases were by Mr. Justice Brennan who wrote the opinion
in New York Times. Justices Black and Douglas voiced their unhappiness in both
cases about the New York Times formula, "so pale and tame." Mr. Justice Fortas
made the point he later elaborated in Hill, that because the cases were tried prior to
New York Times the granting of certiorari was improvident, and the verdicts
should be allowed to stand. Mr. Justice Harlan did not foreshadow the major attack
he was to make on the scope of the Times rule but confined himself to dissenting
on the impersonal libel point in Rosenblatt. Mr. Justice Stewart, who was silent
in the later cases but whose voting pattern is arresting (see note 28 infra), wrote
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Court had two major confrontations with it and produced three
new precedents: Time, Inc. v. Hill,7 Curtis Publishing Company v.
Butts, Associated Press v. Walker.8
The three new cases have yielded roughly 100 new pages of judi-
cial writing on freedom of speech. But even with so substantial a
gloss, it appears that the story has not yet run its course. New York
Times has not yet become the dominant precedent in the law of
free speech and has been applied only in cases not far removed from
the issue of libel of public officials. On the other hand, it is showing
vitality and is stirring formidable controversy within the Court. It
may yet live up to its earlier billing.'
I said, in another context, that "the greatest fascination of law
study is to watch some great event from the real world intersect
with existing legal doctrine."'" But there is also fascination in watch-
ing the centuries-old rigidities, complexities, and elegances of the
Anglo-American law of defamation collide with a rapidly develop-
ing corner of American constitutional law. The one certain predic-
tion I can make is that judicial review of the common law of defa-
mation, launched by the New York Times case, is to be with us for
a while to come."
a vigorous concurrence in Rosenblatt, stressing the large social values performed
by the law of defamation.
Henry was a brief per curiam opinion in a civil action for libel of a county
attorney and a chief of police. The sole issue went to the wording of the jury
instructions concerning defendant's state of mind. The Court reversed judgments
for the plaintiffs on the ground that the instructions might "have been understood
to allow recovery on a showing of intent to inflict harm, rather than intent to inflict
harm through falsehood."
Linn is tangential, since it involved libel in the course of a labor dispute, and the issue
was one of federal preemption. Finally, it might be noted that Times was cited in
Keyishian v. ld. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 598 (1967), on "the dangers [inherent]
in the word 'seditious,"' and in Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), on whether
the public official was to have as much protection as the citizen critic.
7 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
8 Butts and Walker are reported together at 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
0 "In brief compass, my thesis is that the Court, compelled by political realities
of the case to decide it in favor of the Times, yet equally compelled to seek high
ground in justifying its result, wrote an opinion that may prove to be the best
and most important it has ever produced in the realm of freedom of speech." Kalven,
supra note 3, at 193-94.
10 KALVEN, TiE NEGRO AND THE FIRsr AmNDvst'ENT 3 (Phoenix ed. 1965).
11 One can only marvel at the laws capacity for growth here, and for growth
in surprising directions. A decade or so ago I had 9ccsioga g loolk at ft cn.titution.,
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There is one other point of special interest in the new sequence of
cases. It centers on the role of Mr. Justice Harlan. A silent partner
in the opinion of the Court in New York Times, he is the major
voice in the current cases. Indeed, much of the intellectual interest
in the new opinions is due to his writing. In Hill and in Butts, he
made a major effort to limit the New York Times rule to the spe-
cial problems of libel of public officials. He warned against attribut-
ing to New York Times "an unintended inexorability at the thresh-
old of this new constitutional development."' 2 Once again, he
essayed his familiar role as the Justice who, in the aftermath of a
fresh burst of energy by the Court, comes forward to tidy things
up.13
II. THE FAcTrs IN HILL, BUTTs, AND WALKER
Hill proves to be a somewhat complicated case to capture. It
involved not libel but a new species of invasion of privacy, un-
dreamed of by Warren and Brandeis: the so-called "false light"
ality of the law of defamation and was hard put to get enough material together
to round out a brief talk. Kalven, Defamation and the First Amendment, in CoNFER-
ENCE oN ART, PUBLISHING, AND T=E LAW (University of Chicago Conference Series,
1952).
The courts may soon get the problem in a new form. In April, 1967, the Federal
Communications Commission issued a notice of a proposed rule to codify tvo
phases of the "fairness" doctrine. 10 PuE & FISHER, RADio REaG. 2d 1911 (1967).
The phase relevant here would provide in effect for a right of reply whenever a
"personal attack" upon a group or individual had occurred during a broadcast relat-
ing to a controversial public issue. Various broadcasting groups have filed suit chal-
lenging the proposal as a violation of the New York Times rule. And see Red Lion
Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.C., 10 PIKE & FIstaR, RADIO REG. 2001 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
It might be noted that of the six Supreme Court cases since Times, only Henry
and Walker have any connection with issues generated by Negro protest. Whatever
the ad hoc stimulus that was the occasion for New York Times v. Sullivan, it is
apparent that it is now following a logic of its own.
12 388 U.S. at 148.
13 Compare, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957), with Barenblatt
v. United States, 360 U.S. 108 (1959); and compare Lemer v. Casey, 357 U.S. 468
(1958), and Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958), with Slochower v.
Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); and compare Konigsberg v. State
Bar of California, 353 U.S. 252 (1957), with Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366
U.S. 36 (1961), and In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961).
The movement, however, is by no means always in the same direction. See also
Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Manual Enterprises Inc. v. Day, 370
U.S. 478 (1962),
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case,14 which has emerged in recent years as a rival to the traditional
remedies in defamation.' 5
In September, 1952, James Hill and his wife and five children be-
came the subjects of a national news story when they were held
hostage for nineteen hours by three escaped convicts in their sub-
urban home in Pennsylvania. It appears that the convicts in fact
treated them courteously and departed leaving them unharmed.
The Hills subsequently moved to Connecticut and made efforts to
avoid the public spotlight.
In the spring of 1953 James Hayes published Desperate Hours, a
novel that concerned the adventures of a family of four held hos-
tage by three escaped convicts in their suburban home. In the
Hayes story the convicts are not so polite; there is some violence
against the father and son and "a verbal sexual insult" against the
daughter. It appears that Hayes had collected news stories of com-
parable incidents and based his novel on a composite impression.
The Hill news story had, however, "triggered" the writing of the
novel. The Hills appear never to have taken exception to the novel.
In February, 1955, Life magazine ran a picture story about the
fact that the novel was to be made first into a play and later into a
movie. The very brief text' 6 that accompanied the photos an-
14 This special category of privacy was christened by Dean Prosser in Privacy,
48 CALm. L. REv. 383 (1960).
15 It is examined in careful detail in Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy,
15 VAND. L. REv. 1093 (1962), and criticized in Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law:
Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong? 31 LAw & Co-rTEMP. PROB. 326, 339-41 (1966).
It seems that one consequence of the Hill case will be to retard substantially, if not
altogether block, the tendencies of false light privacy to take over the field of defa-
mation.
16 The full text of the Life story as quoted by the Court, 385 U.S. at 377, read
as follows:
"Three years ago Americans all over the country read about the desperate ordeal
of the James Hill family, who were held prisoners in their homes outside Philadelphia
by three escaped convicts. Later they read about it in Joseph Hayes' novel, The
Desperate Hours, inspired by the family's experience. Now they can see the story
re-enacted in Hayes' Broadway play based on the book, and next year will see it
in his movie, which has been filmed but is being held up until the play has a chance
to pay off.
"The play, directed by Robert Montgomery and expertly acted, is a heartstopping
account of how a family rose to heroism in a crisis. LIFE photographed the play
during its Philadelphia tryout, transported some of the actors to the actual house
where the Hills were besieged. On the next page scenes from the play are re-
enacted on the site of the crime."
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nounced that the play was based on the novel that had "been in-
spired by the family's experience." It heralded the play as "a heart-
stopping account of how a family rose to heroism in a crisis." The
thrust of the story, however, was in the photos showing the play's
cast re-enacting "scenes from the play" in the house that the Hills
had occupied at the time of the incident.
The Hills' lawsuit was based on the Life article. The grievance
was that it had given the false impression that the play "mirrored the
Hill family's experience," and that it had sensationalized the story
by adding the note of violence. Perhaps crucial was the disclosure
at the trial that the text had originally stated the play was a "some-
what fictionalized" account of the incident and that in final editing
these words had been dropped.
The plaintiff won a verdict for $50,000 compensatory damages
and $25,000 punitive damages from a jury that had not been in-
structed on the issue of the defendant's state of mind. On appeal, a
new trial was ordered solely on damages. At the retrial without a
jury, plaintiff was awarded $30,000 compensatory damages. It was
that award that was appealed.17 In the Supreme Court, after the case
had been argued twice, 8 the judgment for the plaintiff was reversed
and the case remanded for a new trial under proper instructions.
The key facts about Hill were that it involved privacy and not
libel; that the Hills were private citizens who involuntarily became
subjects of public interest; that the magazine story was held action-
able solely because under New York law the inaccuracies in Life's
reporting defeated the privilege Life otherwise would have had to
report newsworthy events. It is perhaps also important to note that
the case had been in litigation since 1955; that it was originally tried
years before New York Times was decided; and that there is evi-
dence in the record that Life's handling of the story was sloppy.
And finally, it may also be important that the Hills' grievance is not
easy to perceive. The Life story did not show the Hills in an un-
favorable light. Indeed, part of the inaccuracy was that it stressed
their "heroism in a crisis." Whatever harm the story inflicted was
not because of the falsity but because it once again exposed the Hills
17 It appears that in the initial trial the wife also won a substantial verdict ($75,000
compensatory and $25,000 punitive), but the case "was apparently dismissed by
stipulation." See 385 U.S. at 379 n. 2.
18 It is perhaps of some interest to note that counsel for the Hills was Richard
M. Nixon.
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to the gaze of a national public. This is harm, however, for which
New York law would have left the Hills without redress had the
story been accurate. 19
In contrast to Hill, in Butts the grievance is easy to grasp. The
Saturday Evening Post, following a change of editorial policy de-
signed to jack up sagging sales, decided to emphasize "sophisticated
muckraking" articles. In keeping with the new policy it ran the
article in question under the tide "The Story of a Football Fix." A
prefatory note from the editors set the tone and gave the gist of the
piece:20
"Not since the Chicago White Sox threw the 1919 World
Series has there been a sports story as shocking as this one....
Before the University of Georgia played the University of
Alabama... Wally Butts ... gave (to its coach) .. . Georgia's
plays, defense patterns, all the significant secrets Georgia s
football team possessed."
The text revealed that one George Burnett, an insurance salesman,
had accidentally through an electronic error, overheard a telephone
conversation between Butts and Paul Bryant, the Alabama coach, in
which Butts disclosed the plays. Burnett had made notes and sup-
plied specific instances of the plays for the article. The article went
on to describe the dismayed reaction of the beleaguered Georgia
players to the game and the presentation by Burnett of his notes to
the Georgia coach which led to Butts's resignation as athletic direc-
tor. The story ended on a note as unequivocal as the one on which
it began: 21
The chances are that Wally Butts will never help any football
team again.... The investigation by university and South-
eastern Conference officials is continuing; motion pictures of
other games are being scrutinized; where it will end no one so
far can say. But careers will be ruined, that is sure.
Butts brought a libel action against the Post. The principal de-
fense at the trial was truth, but the jury found against the de-
fendants on this point and awarded $60,000 compensatory damages
and $3 million in punitive damages. On appeal the punitive damages
were cut to $400,000. It was this judgment for Butts for $460,000
that was taken to the United States Supreme Court and affirmed.
19 See the discussion of newsworthy truthful reporting under New York law, text
infra, at notes 32-34.
20 388 U.S. at 136. 21 Id. at 137.
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The jury had been instructed that punitive damages could be
awarded on a finding of "actual malice," defined in part as "a wan-
ton or reckless indifference or culpable negligence with regard to
the rights of others."22 The record showed little effort by the Post
editors to check up on the story despite the gravity of the charges
contained in it. As in Hill, the Butts trial had taken place before
New York Times had come down.
Walker on its facts is somewhat similar to Butts. The communi-
cation in question was an AP dispatch reporting the activities of
General Walker on the University of Mississippi campus on the
night of September 30, 1962, when a riot erupted following the
efforts of federal marshals to enroll James Meredith at the Univer-
sity pursuant to court order. The dispatch, an eyewitness account,
stated that Walker had "assumed command" of the crowd and
that "he had led a charge against the marshals." Walker brought a
libel action against the Associated Press.23 As in Butts, the defense of
truth failed. This time the jury awarded $500,000 compensatory
damages and $300,000 punitive damages. The trial judge, who could
find no evidence of malice, struck the punitive damage award. He
also found that New York Times would have required a verdict for
the defendant but ruled that there were "no compelling reasons of
public policy requiring additional defenses to libel" and that New
York Times was not applicable. On appeal he was sustained on both
rulings by the Texas courts. The United States Supreme Court re-
versed, directing a judgment for the defendant. It appeared that
the Associated Press had assigned a young reporter to the Mississippi
riot who had pretty much done the best he could to observe and
note what had happened in the high excitement of the moment.
22 Id. at 173.
2 3 Gen. Walker also brought a series of other libel actions against various news-
papers which had printed the AP dispatch. See, for example, Walker v. Courier-
Journal and Louisville Times Co, 246 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Ky. 1965); Walker v.
Associated Press, 417 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1966); Walker v. Kansas City Star, 406 S.W.2d
44 (Mo. 1966).
The opinion below in the instant case was reported in 393 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. App.
1965). The Texas court, in affirming Walker's judgment, found it unnecessary to
mention New York Times v. Sullivan. In the other Walker cases, however, the
courts agreed that Times controlled. Accordingly the Courier-journal suit was dis-
missed, but the other two suits survived against a motion to dismiss on the view
that General Walker had sufficiently pleaded malice to satisfy the Times standard.
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Ill. You CAN'T TELL THE PLAYERS WITHOUT A SCORE CARD
It has become a commonplace for the Supreme Court to
resort to multiple opinions suggesting unseemly disagreement among
the brethren. The combinations and permutations of positions in
the three new cases, however, when combined with New York
Times, are so spectacular as to justify a brief summary.
Only one of the four judgments survived constitutional scrutiny.
In Butts, the plaintiff walked away from the Supreme Court with
his judgment for $460,000 intact. In Hill, after eleven years of lid-
gation and two arguments in the Supreme Court, the judgment was
reversed and the case remanded for a new trial. In Walker, as in
New York Times, the Court not only upset the judgment but
directed a judgment for the defendant. The decisions in New York
Times and Walker were unanimous. In Hill, the vote was 6 to 3 and
in Butts it was 5 to 4. But the positions of the Justices are far more
intricate than this pattern of votes would suggest, for the votes dis-
close little of the real pattern of disagreement.
In all four cases the Justices agreed that, to a considerable extent,
state tort law is limited by First Amendment considerations. The
disagreements arose over two other issues.24 (1) There was disagree-
ment about the level of privilege that a defendant is to be accorded.
24 There are at least four other subissues in the cases: (1) Whether some conces-
sions should be made in the requirements for precision in the wording of the jury
instructions in light of the fact that the litigation was begun before New York Times
was decided and its rule had become manifest. (2) Whether, in Butts, the defendants
had waived the constitutional issue by not raising it prior to trial. (3) When will
an appellate court, making a de novo finding on the constitutional facts about defend-
ant publisher's state of mind, accept a jury verdict? In Butts Mr. Justice Brennan,
although finding enough in the record to support a verdict against the defendant,
favored remand for a new trial so that a properly instructed jury could exercise
its own judgment. (4) Whether in Hill, the Court could avoid holding the New
York statute invalid on its face. By holding the statute valid but unconstitutionally
applied, the Supreme Court seems to have ordered the New York court to change
its construction of its own statute.
The waiver issue led Mr. Justice Harlan to the rueful public acknowledgment in
Butts that the decision in New York Times may have come as something of a surprise
to the bar. "Although our decision in New York Times did draw upon earlier prece-
dents in state law, e.g., Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711, 98 Pac. 281 ... and there
were intimations in a prior opinion and the extra-judicial comments of one Justice,
that some applications of libel law might be in conflict with the guarantees of
free speech and press, there was strong precedent indicating that civil libel actions
were immune from general constitutional scrutiny." 388 U.S. at 143-44. See supra
note 11.
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(2) There was disagreement about the adequacy of the jury in-
structions sufficiently to safeguard the defendant's privilege.
Essentially it was the varied positions on jury instructions that
account for the dissents.25 In New York Times and Walker, all the
Justices agreed that the instructions were inadequate. In these cases,
they reversed the judgments and directed verdicts for the defend-
ants. In Hill, the three dissenters, Justices Fortas and Clark and the
Chief Justice, felt that the instructions were roughly satisfactory
whatever the appropriate rule of law and that a remand for a new
trial would be too harsh on the plaintiff. In Butts, Justices Brennan
and White favored a remand for a new trial so that a properly in-
structed jury might pass on the matter.2
If the positions on the adequacy of jury instructions explain the
votes, the positions on the level of privilege serve to account for
most of the content of the opinions. Three basic views emerge. In
the center there is Mr. Justice Brennan, who, in all three of the new
cases, would apply the standard of privilege adopted in New York
Times. The Chief Justice and Mr. Justice White joined him in this
position, although, as noted, the Chief Justice disagreed with Jus-
tices Brennan and White in Butts about whether the jury instruc-
tions given at the trial adequately met this standard. To the left of
the Brennan position, so to speak, were Justices Black and Douglas
repeating the arguments they had made in New York Times"r that
the defendant's privilege in these cases should be absolute, a view
they would apply equally in all three of the new cases. And to the
other side of the Brennan position was Mr. Justice Harlan, who
would give a lesser privilege to the defendant in Butts than in New
York Times, and even a lesser privilege to the defendant in Hill
than to the defendant in Butts. He appeared to be alone in Hill, but
was joined by Justices Fortas, Clark, and Stewart in Butts.
25 Although no inconsiderable part of the opinions was concerned with the jury
instruction issue, discussion of the merits of the instructions is beyond the scope
of this essay. I reluctantly put to one side the lively debate between Mr. Justice Fortas
and Justices Brennan and Harlan in Hill and thus forgo examining the hypothesis
that the special sensitivity of the law to the protection of freedom of speech may
include not only a distinctive emphasis regarding prior licensing, ambiguity, chal-
lenge to statutes on their face, and inappropriate choice of means to an end, but also
an exceptional regard for precision in the wording of instructions to the jury.
26There were four dissenting votes in Butts. The other two votes were those of
Justices Black and Douglas, who would have directed a verdict for the defendant
on the ground that he had an absolute privilege.
27 And in Garrison v. Louisiana and again in Rosenblatt v. Baer. See note 6 supra.
[1967
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The complexities thus derive from the combinations of the two
sources of disagreement. For example, no one explicitly joined Mr.
Justice Harlan in Hill, because Justices Fortas and Clark and the
Chief Justice committed themselves only on the adequacy of the in-
structions and not on the issue of the privilege.
The sense of complexity is heightened when the positions of
Justices Stewart and Harlan in Hill and Butts are compared. It will
be remembered Mr. Justice Harlan would distinguish both cases
from New York Times, and further would distinguish them from
each other. So that although in neither case would the defendant be
accorded as strong a privilege as in New York Times, the defendant
would get a stronger privilege in Butts than in Hill. On the other
hand, Mr. Justice Stewart joined with Mr. Justice Brennan to
equate Hill, Harlan's least favored category of case, with New York
Times; but he then agreed with Mr. Justice Harlan in distinguish-
ing Butts from New York Times.2
Perhaps two other points are worth noting. First what might be
called membership in the Harlan faction, that is, the Justices who
are conservative on the scope of New York Times, can be viewed
as going from zero to one to four, as we move from Times itself, to
Hill, to Butts. The final oddity is the relation of Butts to Walker,
decisions that came down on the same day. The opinion of the
Court in Butts was written by Mr. Justice Harlan and adopted his
refusal to extend the New York Times privilege. Chief Justice
Warren concurred in the results in order to save the plaintiff's ver-
dict, but he emphatically disagreed with Mr. Justice Harlan and
would extend the New York Times privilege to the case. Chief
Justice Warren was joined in his position on the privilege by
Justices White and Brennan, thus making three Justices who were
explicitly in favor of the Times privilege. Justices Black and Doug-
las, however, elected in Butts to file unqualified dissents. The upshot,
therefore, was a 5 to 4 decision in Butts, but a 4 to 3 to 2 alignment
on the privilege issue, although it is clear that Justices Black and
Douglas must, as the lesser evil, prefer the New York Times rule to
2 8 Mr. Justice Stewart may well see privacy and defamation as presenting different
First Amendment issues, with, however, publishers deserving more protection against
suits alleging invasions of privacy than in suits alleging defamation. He did not write
a separate opinion in any of the three more recent cases, but his concurring opinion
in Rosenblatt stressed that "the preventive effect of liability for defamation serves
an important public purpose" 383 U.S. 75, 93 (1966).
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the Harlan rule. Moreover, the 5 to 4 decision for the plaintiff in
Butts was, in the end, simply a result of the desire of Chief Justice
Warren, a strong supporter of an across-the-board application of
New York Times, to avoid upsetting the verdict, because he
thought in the particular circumstances the instruction under which
the case had been tried had come close enough to the New York
Times standard.
In Walker, however, Justices Black and Douglas elected to be
more statesmanlike, since the judgment was to be reversed in any
event. This time, therefore, they joined the Warren opinion, which
thereby became the opinion of a bare majority of the Court.
After the dust has settled on this Balkan diplomacy, it becomes
evident that, despite resistance, the New York Times rule has won
across the board. This is not an impression that any quick or con-
ventional reading of the decisions would leave!
It is apparent that behind all this judicial maneuvering lie substan-
tial issues about how to reason by analogy from the New York
Times case, and more important, some fresh theorizing, especially
by Mr. Justice Harlan, about freedom of speech. Throwing away
our score card, it is to such matters that I now turn.
It may be convenient to distinguish two closely related issues in
applying New York Times to new situations. First, there is the
question of the ambit of constitutional protection. To what situa-
tions, other than libel of public officials, does the bonus of constitu-
tional scrutiny and protection extend? Second, there is the question
already noted concerning the level of the protection. What kind of
privilege does the Constitution require that the defendant be given?
These seem to me quite distinct questions, although it is perhaps a
prime strategy of Mr. Justice Harlan to link them together.
One would have thought that the first issue would be the focus of
excitement in the debate and the second would reduce to a technical
detail. Exactly the opposite proved to be the case. There was easy
and almost casual consensus on the ambit of constitutional protec-
tion; there was intense controversy over the level of that protection.
IV. Tim AmBIT oF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
The ambit question might be restated thus: At what point
does the First Amendment no longer permit the states to afford tort
remedies for harms caused by speech?
[1967
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In New York Times the Court had fully confronted the fact that
critical discussion of government actions would often involve not
only impersonal criticisms of general policy but also, as an inextri-
cable by-product, criticisms of individual persons who were the
executors of that policy.29 Since freedom to criticize government
"robustly" was taken to be the crucial, the central freedom in the
First Amendment,s° it was necessary to subject to the closest scru-
tiny claims of any aggrieved individual officials. It was thought
necessary to do so lest it should turn out that tort law would give
to the official the power to censor or silence the citizen-critic of
government.
Public discussion and debate other than criticisms of government
action appear to have the same tendencies to implicate individuals.
One question New York Times left for the future was whether
First Amendment theory and rationale would require a comparable
constitutional scrutiny of the censorial power of aggrieved indi-
viduals.
Conceivably, New York Times could be read as generating a
narrow technical rule limited to government officials and analogous
to the specific constitutional rule immunizing members of Congress
from being "questioned in any other place" for their "speech or
debate" on the floor of Congress. On this approach the question in
each new case would be simply one of the classification of the plain-
tiff. Or it might be argued that the analogy fails here since the con-
gressional immunity has its source in the specific provisions of
Article 1, § 6, whereas the immunity rule of New York Times has
its source in "the central meaning" of the First Amendment.
On their facts, the three new cases offered nice gradations, if a
narrow approach were to be taken. In Hill the plaintiff was a private
citizen who had involuntarily become newsworthy. In Walker the
29 The matter was especially obvious in New York Times, since the statement in
question appeared on its face to refer only to general governmental policy and not
to particular officials. Indeed it took considerable ingenuity on the part of the
plaintiff to connect the statements to himself. The alternative grounds of the deci-
sion in New York Times provided an important new constitutional limitation on
the state law of defamation regarding when defamation was sufficiently "of and
concerning" the plaintiff. This is also a principal point in Rosenblatt v. Baer, supra
note 6; see Kalven, supra note 3, at 209; GREoRY & KAs.vExr, CAsas Am MATERAus
iN ToRTs 968-73 (1959).
30 That such avoidance of seditious libel as an offense was seen as the central
freedom was the point of the special excitement displayed in Kalven, supra note 3.
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plaintiff was a retired United States general of considerable national
prominence and a potential leader of a third force in national poli-
tics. In Butts the plaintiff was a nationally known football coach,
now athletic director at a state university, who was being paid not
by the state but by the Athletic Alumni Association, a separate and
private group.
There were five opinions in Hill, by Justices Brennan, Black,
Douglas, Harlan, and Fortas. Yet there was no debate and remark-
ably little discussion of the ambit of constitutional scrutiny of state
tort law.3 '
The Hill case, it will be remembered, involved invasion of privacy
and not libel, and it is in this circumstance, I suspect, that we find
the key to the structure of Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion. Tradi-
tionally, invasions of privacy have involved statements that are true,
in distinction to defamation where the statement is presumed to be
false. It was a special complication of the Hill case that it concerned
a "false light" privacy claim. Since the tort law of privacy deals
primarily with true statements, there has grown up under the com-
mon-law rules a defendant's privilege quite different from anything
found in the common law of defamation.2 The general rule is that
if defendant's statement deals with newsworthy events and people,
it is privileged, that is, it cannot be made the predicate for tort lia-
bility.3 3
The first step in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion was to establish
that under the New York privacy statute "truth is a complete de-
fense in actions under the statute based upon reports of news-
worthy people or events."34 Indeed this was one of the two points
on which the Court had requested reargument in the Hill case. Mr.
Justice Brennan, however, worded the point so as to jar the ear of a
teacher of torts. The point really is not so much that truth is a
defense as that newsworthiness is a defense.
31 There had been some discussion of the ambit issue in Rosenblatt, turning on
whether the plaintiff, supervisor at a ski resort, could be regarded as a "public offi-
cial" in the sense of the New York Times rule; see note 6 supra; and see especially
the Court's footnote, 383 U.S. at 86 n. 12.
3 2 Kalven, supra note 15, at 336-38.
33 In defamation there has been no analogous concept. Rather there are a series
of specific privileges for "public" discussion, such as record libel and fair comment.
See generally GREGoRY & KALvEN, supra note 29, at 1022-64; Franklin, supra note 3;
and discussion in the text infra at notes 62-70.
34 385 U.S. at 383.
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The apparently elliptical quality in the Brennan opinion, then,
arises because circumstances have made it unnecessary to make ex-
plicit the key premise. That premise is that the First Amendment
requires that the truthful reporting of newsworthy events and
people not be subjected to liability. 5 The premise did not call for
argument because there was the ready consensus on all sides that the
New York privacy statute protects newsworthy reporting when
there is no issue of falsity. What this quick consensus has concealed
from view is that the ambit of "constitutionally scrutinizable"
speech is measured by newsworthiness. Or to put this in McLuhan-
ese, newsworthiness measures the ambit. The newsworthy is a kind
of speech which is public enough so that its protection cannot be
left entirely to state policy. Presumably, had this point been chal-
lenged in Hill, we would have been given the explicit statement of
why this category of speech requires constitutional protection.
Having established the newsworthiness privilege under New
York law, the Brennan opinion traced with care via the Spahn
case"6 the New York law about reports that were newsworthy but
35 "There is a possibility that the newsworthiness privilege in privacy will acquire
constitutional status and thus become independent of state policy." Kalven, supra
note 15, at 336 n. 57. The Court in quoting from this article in Hill, 385 U.S. at 383
n. 7, omits the observation that "today since New York Times v. Sullivan the
privilege may arguably have some constitutional status."
30 Spahn v. Messner, 18 N.Y.2d 324 (1966). The Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Spahn and remanded it for a new trial in light of Hill. 387 U.S. 239 (1967).
The difficulties with the New York rule go not only to the point that concerned
the United States Supreme Court, namely, that it imposes strict liability for "false
light" privacy invasions, but also to the fact that the New York courts have been
so preoccupied with the role of "falsity" in erasing the newsworthy privilege that
they have not looked to see if there was a prima facie invasion of privacy in the
first place that required the protection of a privilege to avoid liability. That is,
the falsity, although not defamatory (and in Hill, arguably laudatory), has somehow
magnified what would otherwise appear to be a trivial grievance.
The triviality of the grievance in Hill was of course not a proper consideration
for the United States Supreme Court, but rather for the New York Court of
Appeals. (Fuld, J., dissented in the Hill case in the New York Court of Appeals,
15 N.Y.2d 986 [1965].) The reactions of the Justices to the facts in Hill, however,
are curious. Mr. Justice Black saw it as "at most a mere understandable and incidental
error," 385 U.S. at 400; Mr. Justice Harlan spoke of the "severe risk of irremediable
harm," id. at 410; Mr. Justice Fortas wrote of "reckless and irresponsible assault
upon himself and his family," id. at 411.
Possibly, the case does involve a very subtle form of defamation in the circum-
stance that one item of "falsity" was the portrayal of the father making a "brave
try" to save his family.
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not totally accurate. The opinion then announced the relevant prin-
ciple:S
If this [the view of the New York Court of Appeals in Spahn
that "fictionalized" biography is not within constitutional pro-
tection] is meant to imply that the proof of knowing or reck-
less falsity is not essential to a constitutional application of the
statute in these cases, we disagree with the Court of Appeals.
We hold that the constitutional protections for speech and
press preclude the application of the New York statute to re-
dress false reports of matters of public interest in the absence
of proof that the defendant published the report with knowl-
edge of its falsity or in reckless disregard of the truth.
The argument offered in support of this conclusion was notably
brief. First, we were told that the "guarantees for speech and press
are not the preserve of political expression or comment on public
affairs, essential as those are to healthy government."38 The point
left implicit, presumably, is that while the avoidance of seditious
libel may be the central purpose of the First Amendment, it is not
its only purpose. New York Times v. Sullivan gave an invaluable
perspective to free speech analysis; it did not, however, attempt to
set the outermost boundaries of First Amendment protection.
Second, Mr. Justice Brennan took judicial notice of "the vast
range of published matter which exposes persons to public view,
both private citizens and public officials. Exposure of the self to
others in varying degrees is a concomitant of life in a civilized com-
munity. The risk of this exposure is an essential incident of life in
a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and
press. '8 9 We were being reminded, as I see it, that newsworthiness
defines the ambit of constitutional concern and that this is so even
though the public aspects of such communications are interlaced
inextricably with comments on individuals. Names make news, but
they do not thereby take it out of the public domain. For the mo-
ment, as the argument moved, it did not crucially matter whether
the statements in question were true or false. What mattered was
that they were in some sense public and that the domain of "mixed
utterance," 40 speech that has both public and individual aspects, is
vast and of high importance to civilized life.41
37385 U.S. at 387-88. 381d. at 388. s9 Ibid.
40 Cf. United States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 207 (2d Cir. 1959), where Judge
Learned Hand spoke of utterances which have a "double aspect; i.e., when persua-
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It remained for the Brennan opinion to take only one further step
-to add the minor premise-and the argument about ambit would
be completed. "We have no doubt," the opinion reads, "that the
subject of the Life article, the opening of a new play linked to an
actual incident is a matter of public interest." 42
This then is the Brennan thesis: Newsworthiness defines the
ambit of constitutional concern. The Life report in the instant case
was newsworthy. It is therefore within the sphere in which state-
law remedies for aggrieved individuals are subject to judicial review
under the First Amendment. All that remained was to determine
what level of privilege the Constitution required state law to afford
the defendant publisher.
The most strilting thing about Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion is
that he apparently reached his result without reasoning by analogy
from New York Times. In fact he found it unnecessary to mention
Times in this part of his argument. Yet Times would seem to be a
silent partner in the decision. What it did was to illuminate for the
Court the possibilities for censorship, by individual libel actions, of
criticism of government operation and policy. It thus set the per-
spective the Court took toward the events in Hill. The individual
tort action, albeit in privacy, carries a comparable threat of censor-
ship over valued, albeit less urgently valued, public speech. Thus
although Hill with its mild entertainment news value was on its
facts a world removed from New York Times on its grim facts
about Negro protests, the two cases were seen to fall within a com-
mon sphere-speech affecting individuals that is of public interest.
One other point clamors for attention before I turn to the other
four opinions. Although it was not necessary in Hill to delineate the
outer boundaries of the newsworthy, the Court may be surprised by
the extent of its commitment. The tort law of privacy has wrestled
with the matter for some years now; and it is a rough generalization
that the courts will not, and indeed cannot, be arbiters of what is
sion and instigation were inseparably confused" The inextricable linking of "bad"
speech with "good" is a charateristic also of the obscenity problem. See Kalven, The
Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 SUPREM E CouRT REviEw 1, 11-12.
41 The Court quotes the following from Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102
(1940): "Freedom of discussion, if it would fulfill its historic function in this
nation, must embrace all issues about which information is needed or appropriate
to enable the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their period."
42 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967).
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newsworthy. Newsworthiness will almost certainly become a de-
scriptive and not a normative term.48 In brief, the press will be the
arbiters of it and the Court will be forced to yield to the argument
that whatever the press prints is by virtue of that fact newsworthy.
This has been pretty much the experience with the common-law
policy. It is not clear that the matter will prove more tractable if we
try it as constitutional policy. The upshot, and it is an important
one, is that the logic of New York Times and Hill taken together
grants the press some measure of constitutional protection for any-
thing the press thinks is a matter of public interest.
There is little to discuss in the other four opinions as they bear on
the ambit issue. The Justices were saving their fire for other issues.
Mr. Justice Black, as would be expected, had no quarrel with the
newsworthiness criterion. He devoted his opinion to repeating his
complaint that the protection given the press was not absolute. In
the final sentences of his opinion, however, one can detect his full
agreement that the press qua press be given constitutional protection
for whatever it sees fit to print:44
One does not have to be a prophet to foresee that judgments
like the one we here reverse can frighten and punish the press
so much that publishers will cease trying to report news in a
lively and readable fashion as long as there is-and there always
will be-doubt as to the complete accuracy of the newsworthy
facts. Such a consummation hardly seems consistent with the
clearly expressed purposes of the Founders to guarantee the
press a favored spot in our free society.
Mr. Justice Douglas was equally happy with the ambit of protec-
tion and equally unhappy with its level. He stated explicitly that the
First and Fourteenth Amendments protect the press "where the dis-
cussion concerns matters in the public domain."4 5 And he went on
to draw flatly the analogy to the New York Times case. "Here a
private person is catapulted into the news by events over which he
had no control. He and his activities are then in the public domain
as fully as the matters at issue in New York Times v. Sullivan.114
Mr. Justice Harlan in his interesting and complex opinion took
issue only with the level of protection that the Court gave. Indeed,
he was more explicit than was Mr. Justice Brennan that if the story
43See Kalven, supra note 15; cf. Franidin, A Constitutional Problem in Privacy
Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAir. L. REv. 107 (1963).
44385 U.S. at 400-01. 45 1d. at 401. 46 Ibid.
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had been true it would require protection. He agreed, too, that
some degree of protection was constitutionally required for the fals-
ity involved in the Hill case. And he joined in reversing the judg-
ment for the failure of the state law to provide the requisite degree
of protection. It might, however, be closer to the spirit of his opin-
ion to read him as taking issue with the possibility of separating
ambit from level as sharply as I have done. His whole approach is to
vary the level of protection as the speech in question moves away
from matters of central public concern-and he is willing to cali-
brate exceedingly fine to work out his design.
Mr. Justice Fortas in a spirited opinion came closest to open
quarrel on the ambit issue. His principal point, however, as I have
noted, was that the instructions given at the Hill trial were close
enough to the Court's standards to make it wasteful and indecent to
remand the eleven-year-old case for another trial. But before he
turned to his analysis of the instructions, he spoke out vigorously for
privacy as "a basic right' and suggested that it belonged in the top
drawer of "great and important values in our society" along with
those "reflected in the First Amendment."48 Although he did not
quite join issue on the point, it is apparent that for him news-
worthiness would not invariably and inflexibly outweigh privacy.
Then in a telling passage he observed:4"
I have no hesitancy to say, for example, that where political
personalities or issues are involved or where the event as to
which the alleged invasion of privacy occurred is in itself a
matter of current public interest, First Amendment values are
supreme and entitled to at least the types of protection that
this Court extended in New York Times v. Sullivan.
Yet, in the end, his opinion remains unclear. I cannot tell whether
he was complaining that the Life story was not a matter of public
interest or about the degree of falsity he found in it. I suspect that
had the Life story been fully accurate Mr. Justice Fortas, too, would
have yielded the claims of the Hills for privacy to the public inter-
est in news.
It may be worth risking some repetition to underscore once again
what seems to have happened in Hill. Although a bare five of the
nine Justices were amenable to upsetting Mr. Hill's hard-won ver-
dict, the four who disagreed with the Court's handling of the case
47 Id. at 404. 48 Id. at 412. 49 Id. at 415.
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somehow dissipated their attack and failed to provide any effective
or central criticism of the key fact that the Court had now extended
constitutional scrutiny of state tort law to whatever is newsworthy.
Moreover the Court had taken this giant step without being forced
to an explicit justification for it and without openly invoking New
York Times.
In retrospect it appears that the Court may have been handi-
capped by the sequence in which the cases came to it. Hill was a
curiously difficult case to handle so soon after New York Times.
The Court's task might have been easier had the more obvious prob-
lems of Butts and Walker been disposed of first. In any event, I
turn now to those two cases and to the Court's response to the
ambit issue.
Butts and Walker were decided just six months after Hill, and
this time there were four opinions: those of the Chief Justice and
Justices Harlan, Black, and Brennan. In the opinions of Warren
and Harlan there was full recognition of the ambit issue.
If it was a puzzle why in Hill the Court did not draw openly on
New York Times, it is equally a puzzle in Butts and Walker why
the Court did not see the relevance of Hill, which had arguably
foreclosed the ambit issue. Instead it now went back to New York
Times for guidance on the extent of constitutional protection.
The Harlan opinion in Butts opens with a sketch of the conten-
tions of opposing counsel. On the one hand, it was argued that be-
cause Butts was in a sense a minor public official in his role as
athletic director at a state university and because General Walker
had "thrust himself into the vortex ''" ° of public controversy, the
two cases were literally within the Times holding. On the other
hand, it was stressed that these cases were far removed from "sedi-
tious libel prosecutions." Quoting Buckley v. New York Post,51
50 The "vortex" metaphor originated in Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosen-
blatt v. Baer, 383 US. at 86 n. 12; see also Pauling v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co.,
362 F.2d 188, 195 (2d Cir. 1966).
51373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967). The quotation is from the opinion of Judge
Friendly. Judge Friendly was discussing whether the First Amendment offered
an obstacle to the claim of Connecticut to jurisdiction in a libel action over the
defendant newspaper, a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business
in New York. He was not discussing what risks of tort liability are to be placed on
publishers. The rest of the sentence reads: ".... and injured persons should not be
relegated to forums so distant as to make collection of their claims dificult or im-
possible unless strong policy considerations demand." Cf. 388 U.S. at 147. On the
precise issue of how far New York Times extends, see Judge Friendly's opinion in
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plaintiffs urged that "Like other enterprises that inflict damage in
the course of performing services highly useful to the public" the
press "must pay the freight."
The force of these competing considerations requires, we were
told, "an accommodation between them.., not only in these cases
but in all libel actions arising from a publication concerning public
issues. ' 52 Then Mr. Justice Harlan squarely confronted the ambit
issue:I'
From the point of view of deciding whether a constitutional
interest of free speech and press is properly involved in the
resolution of a libel question, a rational distinction "cannot be
founded on the assumption that criticism of private citizens
who seek to lead in the determination of... policy will be
less important to the public interest than will criticism of
public officials."
It was thus New York Times and not Hill that provided the touch-
stone for Mr. Justice Harlan. The ambit of constitutional concern
was to be measured not by a concept of newsworthiness but less
sweepingly by step-by-step analogies to public officials. The ambit
of protection had been extended, to use the Justice's idiom, from
public officials to "public figures." The conclusion was "that libel
actions of the present kind cannot be left entirely to state libel laws,
unlimited by any overriding constitutional safeguards." 54
This summary does not do justice, however, to Mr. Justice
Harlan's complex and fresh theorizing in Butts and Walker about
free speech because his expressed interest was not so much in the
extent to which state law is "overridden" by constitutional consid-
erations as in the precise level of safeguard the Constitution will
require for the speech. In brief his thesis is that New York Times
may set the ambit of protection, but it emphatically does not set the
level of protection. It does not incorporate "the only appropriate
accommodation of the conflicting interests at stake."'55
The other explicit discussion of ambit in Butts is found in the
Pauling v. News Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964), readily extending it
to Dr. Linus Pauling, a private citizen engaged in public controversy.
52 388 U.S. at 147.
53 Id. at 147-48. Mr. Justice Harlan was quoting from Judge Blackmun, in Pauling
v. Globe-Democrat Pub. Co., 362 F.2d 188, 196 (8th Cir. 1966)
54 388 U.S. at 155. 551Ibid.
HeinOnline  -- 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 287 1967
288 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
opinion of Chief Justice Warren. "All of us agree," he stated,
"that the basic considerations underlying the First Amendment re-
quire that some limitations be placed on the application of state libel
laws to 'public figures' as well as 'public officials.' "51
Then in a passage with arresting overtones of contemporary so-
ciology he argued that there is no longer a sharp difference in
modern life between the governmental and the private:
5 7
To me, differentiation between "public figures" and "public
officials" and adoption of separate standards of proof for each
has no basis in law, logic, or First Amendment policy. Increas-
ingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental
and private sectors are blurred. Since the depression of the
1930's and World War II there has been a rapid fusion of eco-
nomic and political power, a merging of science, industry, and
government, and a high degree of interaction between the in-
tellectual, governmental, and business worlds. Depression, war,
international tensions, national and international markets, and
the surging growth of science and technology have precipi-
tated national and international problems that demand national
and international solutions. While these trends and events have
occasioned a consolidation of governmental power, power has
also become much more organized in what we have commonly
considered to be the private sector. In many situations, policy
determinations which traditionally were channeled through
formal political institutions are now originated and imple-
mented through a complex array of boards, committees, com-
missions, corporations, and associations, some only loosely
connected with the Government. This blending of positions
and power has also occurred in the case of individuals so that
many who do not hold public office at the moment are never-
theless intimately involved in the resolution of important pub-
lic questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas
of concern to society at large.
The minor premise-the application of the "public figure" formu-
la to the facts in Butts and Walker-did not detain the Justices for
long. And, for this purpose at least, the Court saw no difference
between Wally Butts and General Walker. Mr. Justice Harlan
stated: I5
We note that the public interest in the circulation of the ma-
terials here involved, and the publisher's interest in circulating
them, is not less than that involved in New York Times. And
both Butts and Walker commanded a substantial amount of
.57 Id. at 163-64.56 Id. at 162. 58 Id. at 154-55.
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public interest at the time of the publications; both in our
opinion would have been labeled "public figures" under or-
dinary tort rules.... Butts may have attained that status by
position alone and Walker by his purposeful activity amount-
ing to a thrusting of his personality into the "vortex" of an
important public controversy.
Chief Justice Warren, after noting that both cases involved "pub-
lic figures," was explicit only with respect to General Walker:
"Under any reasoning, General Walker was a public man in whose
public conduct society and the press had a legitimate and substan-
tial interest."' 0
There is little basis for complaint about the logic by which the
Court has expanded the range of protected speech in Butts and
Walker. It has done exactly what would have been predicted from
New York Times, radiating outward gradually by analogy 0 from
the core protection in Times. What is difficult to fit in is the re-
sponse to the Hill precedent. We ask again why did Hill not make
an a fortiori case for some constitutional protection in Butts and
Walker? Why was it necessary in Butts and Walker to make a fresh
argument on the ambit issue? Are we to conclude that, for the
moment, there are two ambits of constitutionally protected speech,
one appropriate only for false statements about individuals treated
as privacy actions, the other reserved for false statements about
individuals treated as libel actions? If Mr. Hill had been defamed,
would he have met no constitutional obstacles to his recovery? Or
is he too a "public figure"? 6'
If the cases had come to the Court in the opposite order, I suspect
the Court would have "worried" the issue whether Mr. Hill was
sufficiently a public figure, and very likely would have decided he
59 Id. at 165.
60 And what was easily done by the courts of appeals in the Pauling cases. Pauling
v. Globe-Democrat Publishing Co., 362 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1966); Pauling v. News
Syndicate Co., 335 F.2d 659 (2d Cir. 1964); and foreshadowed in Rosenblatt v.
Baer, 383 U.S. at 86 n. 12.
61 Despite all this, it is difficult to down the impression that the Court's silence
about Hill was deliberate and that it has seen the two cases as presenting problems
it wishes to keep separate. Perhaps its point is that it does not wish to inhibit libel
actions as much as it does privacy actions, since the former reflect a more serious
and more traditional form of harm. But this can scarcely be the thesis of Justices
Harlan, Fortas, and Clark, since their proposal was to give the plaintiff more
protection in Hill than in Butts by giving the defendant publisher a less generous
privilege; see note 28 supra.
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was not. Since it seems to me that the Hill case was rightly decided
and that the Court now has in hand a single coherent doctrine for
handling the problem of false statements about individuals that in-
terlace public discourse, perhaps the sequence of the cases was a
benign accident.
V. THE LEVEL OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
We come at last to the issue on which the Justices fall out
among themselves in lively and sharp debate: granted that, because
of the public interest in his communication, the defendant cannot
be left to the mercy of state policy, just how much protection does
the First Amendment require that he be given?
The common law of defamation, yielding slowly to the policies
favoring a free press, worked out an elaborate series of accommo-
dations for the competing interests, and as a complement thereto
an elaborate gradation of privileges for false statements abudt indi-
viduals. There is the absolute privilege of judge, legislator, and
executive when at work, a privilege indefeasible whatever the state
of mind of the defendant.62 There is the qualified privilege for the
useful, private communication, such as the employee character ref-
erence.6 3 And here there is a split of authority, some states holding
the privilege defeasible only by proof of malice, recklessness, or
knowing falsity, other states holding that ordinary negligence is
enough.6" To complicate matters further, there are the two sets of
privileges for "public" communications: fair comment and record
libel. The record libel privilege covers the repeating of defamation
contained in a public record and is probably not defeasible at all so
long as the statement accurately reports what the public record
contains.65 Fair comment, as the Court discovered in New York
Times, is mysterious doctrine relying heavily on distinctions be-
tween fact and opinion and the degree of disclosure of underlying
fact.6 And there may be still further differences between com-
6 2 Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
63 See, e.g., Watt v. Longsdon, [1930] 1 K.B. 130.
64 See the note in GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 29, at 1018-21
65 See, e.g., Cresson v. Louisville Courier-Journal, 299 Fed. 487 (6th Cir. 1924); and
see GREGORY & KALVEN, supra note 29, at 1023-32.
6OSee, e.g., Eickhoff v. Gilbert, 124 Mich. 353 (1900); and see Noel, Defamation
of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 COLUm. L. REv. 875 (1949); GREGORY & IALVEN,
supra note 29, at 1032-58; Veeder, Freedom of Public Discmsion, 23 HARv. L. REv.
413 (1910).
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ment by way of literary criticism and comment on public officials,
candidates for office, or other public figures. And as to public offi-
cials or figures there have been at least two rules of fair comment.
One imposes strict liability for accuracy in statements of fact but
affords a privilege to the expressions of opinion, as did the Alabama
law in New York Times. The other broadens the privilege so as
also to protect error in the underlying statements of fact if made
in good faith. And arguably "good faith" in this formula might
mean either the absence of negligence or something more. It was
into this bramble bush of distinctions that the Court jumped in New
York Times.
There is one other principle of the common law of defamation
that needs to be noted. The normal basis of liability in defamation,
in sharp and puzzling contrast to most of the rest of the law of torts,
is strict liability. In the ordinary case it does not matter how inno-
cent the defendant is if his communication can be read as defaming
the plaintiff.6 7 The great role of the common-law privileges in
defamation has been, therefore, to abate the harshness of the strict
liability principle rather than to give exceptional protection to a
particular category of communication. Arguably, if defamation had
been assimilated in nineteenth-century tort theory and keyed to
liability limited to negligence, no doctrines of privilege would have
ever developed. And finally as a footnote to Hill, I would note that
under the New York statute, "false light" privacy is also a matter
of strict liability.68
As Mr. Justice Harlan acutely notes in Butts, the common law
of defamation "originated in soil entirely different from that which
nurtured these constitutional values."69 It began with a perception
of the harms to individuals and only very gradually yielded to any
competing perception of the public interest in speech. We need
only remember that it was not until Wason v. Walter70 in 1868
67 The classic analysis is Smith, Jones v. Hulton: Three Conflicting Judicial Views
as to a Question in Defamation, 60 U. PA. L. REv. 365 (1912).
68 In sharp contrast to defamation, there has been little discussion of the basis of
liability in privacy; see Kalven, supra note 15, at 334-35.
60 388 U.S. at 151.
70 L.R. 4 Q.B. 73 (1868). Lord Cockburn observed: "It seems to us impossible to
doubt that it is of paramount public and national importance that the proceedings
of the houses of parliament shall be communicated to the public, who have the deep-
est interest in knowing what passes within their walls, seeing that on what is there
said and done, the welfare of the community depends. Where would be our con-
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that English law recognized a privilege in the press voluntarily to
republish proceedings in Parliament. If, however, one begins in the
opposite corner with the First Amendment and with a perception
of the public interest in free public discourse, the question is
whether such a common-law calculus of interests is the appropriate
model.
Against this common-law backdrop the question in the three
new cases is whether there is any middle ground on which Mr.
Justice Brennan and his allies can stand. The Black and Douglas
position, that any risk of liability whatsoever must somewhat inhibit
speech on matters of public interest and hence be a violation of the
First Amendment, and the Harlan position, that more than a public
interest in speech and press is involved and that no single formula
can accommodate sensibly the competing interests, appear on the
surface to occupy the two possible intellectual positions. Is the
Brennan position, then, simply a matter of political expediency, a
compromise impeachable by both the right and the left as lacking in
principle? Can Mr. Justice Brennan resist the Black and Douglas
absolutism without finding he has embraced Harlan; and conversely
can he argue against Harlan's elaborate calculus without finding he
has embraced Black and Douglas?
This time the three cases can conveniently be read together. Mr.
Justice Brennan made the argument in Hill and it was restated by
Chief Justice Warren in Butts. Justices Black and Douglas each
stated their argument in Hill and Mr. Justice Black stated it once
again for their side in Butts. Finally, Mr. Justice Harlan made an
fidence in the government of the country or in the legislature by which our laws are
framed, and to whose charge the great interests of the country are committed,-
where would be our attachment to the constitution under which we live,-if the
proceedings of the great council of the realm were shrouded in secrecy and con-
cealed from the knowledge of the nation? How could the communications between
the representatives of the people and their constituents, which are so essential to the
working of the representative system, be usefully carried on, if the constituencies
were kept in ignorance of what their representatives are doing? What would become
of the right of petitioning on all measures pending in parliament, the undoubted
right of the subject, if the people are to be kept in ignorance of what is passing in
either house? Can any man bring himself to doubt that the publicity given in modem
times to what passes in parliament is essential to the maintenance of the relations
subsisting between the government, the legislature, and the country at large?" Id. at
89. See also Stockdale v. Hansard, 9 Ad. & E. 1 (1839), and the delightful account
of this historic conflict between court and Parliament, in Dm.w, HATRED, Rmicuir AND
CoirErAwT 202-11 (1953).
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elaborate and careful argument for his position in Hill, and again
in Butts.
The Black and Douglas opinions in Hill understandably have a
somewhat tired sound. The Justices had made their point originally
in New York Times and repeated it in Rosenhlatt v. Baer.71 A
variety of points were put forward this time: "[R]ecldess disregard
of the truth" will prove, Mr. Justice Black argued, little protection
for defendants in the world of real trials. The "New York Times'
dilution of First Amendment rights,"7 2 they prophesied, will be
shown by experience to be as inadequate as the rule of Betts v.
Brady. The defeasible privilege of the majority would not be ar-
rived at "without using the recently popularized weighing and
balancing formula." 73
Turning to the case itself, Mr. Justice Black noted: "Life's con-
duct here was at most a mere understandable and incidental error
of fact in reporting a newsworthy event. ' 74 Since the majority
reversed only to remand for a new trial and did not on this record
direct for the defendant, we get, he implied, a clue to what a slender
reed the majority's criterion of "malice" will prove to be.
The point is sharpened by Mr. Justice Douglas in Hill. Speaking
of the "knowing or reckless falsity" test, he said: 75
Such an elusive exception gives the jury, the finder of the
facts, broad scope and almost unfettered discretion. A trial is
a chancy thing, no matter what safeguards are provided. To
let a jury on this record return a verdict or not as it chooses
is to let First Amendment rights ride on capricious or whimsi-
cal circumstances, for emotions and prejudices often do carry
the day.
The acerbity increased in Mr. Justice Black's restatement of the
theme in Butts. He saw the reversal in Walker and the affirmance
in Butts as "quite contradictory action ' 76 depending on the Court's
subjective judgments about the offensiveness of the libel and the
quality of the reporting, and went on to argue solemnly that the
Court's involvement with questions of fact under the New York
Times test is "in flat violation of the Seventh Amendment." 77 He
then delivered what must be the unkindest cut of all-he stated that
71 383 U.S. 75 (1966).
72 385 U.S. at 399. 74 Id. at 400. 76 388 U.S. at 171.
73 Ibid. 75 Id. at 402. 7't Ibid.
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the Court was getting itself into the same "quagmire" in libel as it
had in obscenity.78 He once again predicted that Ne, York Times
will go the way of Betts v. Brady and concluded with the point-
blank challenge: "I think it is time for this Court to abandon New
York Times v. Sullivan and adopt the rule to the effect that the
First Amendment was intended to leave the press free from the
harassment of libel judgments." 79
The Black-Douglas argument does not seem to me to deepen in
repetition. We are not told whether it is only the press who are to
be the beneficiaries of an immunity from libel. Are other communi-
cators to be left to its rules? We are not told whether the only
reason for making the protection absolute is a distrust of the ca-
pacity of the legal system to discriminate or whether there is some
value in the circulation of knowing falsehood.8 There seems to be
no sense of surprise at finding out after all these years that all or
most of the law of defamation has been wholly unconstitutional.
There is no recognition that counterspeech cannot be the remedy
for this evil.8' Again there is no recognition that the countervalue
to the speech this time is the risk of harm to individuals. What, for
example, would the Black and Douglas position say about a libel
judgment such as that in Faulk v. Aware, Inc.?82 The special weak-
ness of the legal system in libel, its use of the jury, is a point that cer-
tainly would have ironic overtones as a matter of history. Finally,
in calling for the abandonment of the New York Times rule, there
is a sense of not knowing who one's friends are.
Nevertheless there is a point to their thesis. One might develop
a free-speech theory on the premise that we must overprotect
speech in order to protect the speech that matters. At least then it
would be clear what the argument was and was not about. More-
over, once it has been conceded, as all Justices do in Hill and Butts,
that the speech in question is within the ambit of some constitutional
protection, there is admittedly bite in the Black-Douglas challenge
78 Ibid. 79 Id. at 172.
80 As, so notably, John Stuart Mill had argued in On Liberty.
81 See, however, discussion of Mr. Justice Harlan's reliance on counterspeech in
these cases, text infra, at notes 99-100.
82 244 N.Y. S.2d 259 (1963). The dramatic history of the case is recounted in
FAuU, FEAR ON TRLAL (1964), and again in NzEa, THE JuRy RruRNs 225-438
(1966).
[1967
HeinOnline  -- 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 294 1967
THE REASONABLE MAN AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 295
of how we can permit constitutionally significant speech to be
inhibited-a challenge, it hardly needs stating, that will be felt most
acutely by Mr. Justice Brennan and his allies.
The argument that the Court has not given enough protection
to speech was aired in New York Times. New ground was broken,
however, by the challenge from Mr. Justice Harlan and his col-
leagues that the Court is now giving too much protection to speech,
a position no one had argued for in New York Times.
Mr. Justice Harlan announced at the outset of his opinion in Hill
that he expressed disagreement only "after finding much with
which I agree in the opinion of the Court."8 He then proceeded to
restate the areas of agreement: the instructions under which the
case was tried cannot, as Mr. Justice Fortas valiantly argued, be
read as providing any privilege for unintentional falsity; the Life
story was within the ambit of constitutional concem-"an article of
this type could have been prepared without liability."'8 4 He was
then ready for his principal point: "Having come this far with the
Court's opinion, I must part company with its sweeping extension
of the principles of New York Times v. Sullivan."5
The problem, as he lucidly stated it, is what impact falsity is to
have on otherwise constitutionally protected speech. New York
Times, he recognized, said in effect that "mere falsity" would not
remove the constitutional protection. But the protection of falsity,
he ably argued, is strategic; the Court "has never found independent
value in false publications nor any reason for their protection ex-
cept to add to the protection of truthful communication.""" But the
strategy must vary, depending on the exact need for the "over-
protection" in a given context and on the countervalue the state is
seeking to protect.
In the special circumstances of New York Times, as he saw it,
there were two factors that made it appropriate to afford the privi-
lege to make false statements about individuals. First, there was,
because of public interest in the official's behavior, some chance for
counterspeech to challenge and correct false impression. Second,
the aggrieved individuals had, as public officials, to some extent
83 385 U.S. at 402. 84 Id. at 404. 85 Id. at 405.
86 This understated Mill's point on behalf of falsity; but Mill was concerned with
the utility of false doctrine, not false fact about individuals. See text infra, at notes
99-100.
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assumed the risk of false publicity, thus reducing the state's interest
in protecting them.
In the Hill case, however, neither of these factors was present.
Mr. Hill was involuntarily a newsworthy figure; he was not hard-
ened to the vicissitudes of publicity; and he could not be said to
have assumed its risks. There was, therefore, "a vast difference in
the state interest in protecting individuals like Mr. Hill from irre-
sponsibly prepared publicity and the state interest in similar pro-
tection for a public official."87
Mr. Justice Harlan also saw significant differences in the oppor-
tunities for counterspeech in the two cases. In cases of public offi-
cials there could be "a competition among ideas" that would reduce
the harm from the falsity left uncorrected by legal means. But in
Hill "such a competition is extremely unlikely." "It would be un-
reasonable to assume," we are told in a remarkable sentence, "that
Mr. Hill could find a forum for making a successful refutation of
the Life material or that the public's interest in it would be sufficient
for the truth to win out by comparison as it might in that area of
discussion central to a free society."88
These two distinctions drawn, the argument moved quickly to
its conclusion. The "knowing or reckless disregard" standard of
New York Times strikes the wrong balance here where private
persons, involuntarily newsworthy, are involved. In this context it
is a poor strategy and it leaves an undue risk of harm from false-
hood. Therefore the Constitution should be satisfied if the state
grants the press a qualified privilege defeasible upon a showing of
negligence. This difference in state of mind between negligence8"
and reckless disregard, then, is for Mr. Justice Harlan the appro-
priate measure of the relevant differences in the two contexts of
communications, albeit each involves a matter of public interest.
There are three interesting addenda to the Harlan argument. If
it is argued that this rule will unduly inhibit the press in dealing
with what are avowedly matters of public interest, the Harlan
87 385 U.S. at 408. 88 Id. at 407-08.
89 It must be acknowledged that Mr. Justice Harlan did not state explicitly at any
one place in his opinion the precise formula for the standard. On page 409, he
talked of holding the press "to a duty of making a reasonable investigation of the
underlying facts." On page 410 the phrasing shifted to creating "a severe risk
of irremediable harm," and again on page 410 he referred to the duty he would
impose as "this minimal responsibility:'
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answer "from a pragmatic standpoint" is that the New York press
has been operating under the more inhibiting rules of the New
York privacy statute and "has certainly remained robust."90 We
are also admonished, in a sentence that matches Mr. Justice Black
in tone, that if even this minimal responsibility cannot under New
York Times constitutionally be imposed on the press, that case "will
prove in its long range impact to have done a disservice to the true
values encompassed in the freedoms of speech and press."91 (It is
hard not to say, borrowing from W. C. Fields, that a case that is
so vigorously condemned from both left and right cannot be alto-
gether bad.) And finally, in an arresting aside, we are reminded
that "other professional activity of great social value is carried on
under a duty of reasonable care and there is no reason to suspect
the press would be less hardy than medical practitioners or attor-
neys for example."' 2
Mr. Justice Harlan returned to this argument in Butts. This time
it was somehow less elegant and less concise. After acknowledging
that the communications about Butts and Walker as public figures
were within the ambit of constitutional protection, he went back
to his principal interest-showing that New York Times does not
represent the only accommodation between the conflicting interests.
But, as on the ambit issue, there was again a curious reluctance to
utilize directly what was said in Hill. Instead we are given a some-
what lengthy essay on the history of free speech and then a shorter
essay on the quite different soil from which the law of defamation
sprang, underscoring the consequent tension between these two
legal traditions.
After this preface, Mr. Justice Harlan took up the cases at hand.
One might have thought, he said, that truth would mark the bound-
ary between protected and unprotected speech, but the Court was
committed to giving some protection to inadvertent falsity. This
was the lesson of New York Times.9" Times, however, is to be
sharply distinguished. It lay close to seditious libel and nothing of
that was present in the instant cases. Plaintiffs were not public offi-
cials. There was, however, one similarity: both Butts and Walker
901d. at 409-10. 91 ld. at 410-11. 92 Id. at 410.
93 "In any event, the Times opinion is as great a contribution to the issue of the
relevance of truth to protected speech as it is to the issue of the relevance of the
doctrine of seditious libel." Kalven, supra note 3, at 213.
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"commanded sufficient continuing public interest and had sufficient
access to the means of counterargument to be able 'to expose
through discussion the falsehoods and fallacies' of the defamatory
statements."94 The cases were, therefore, like Times in some re-
spects and unlike it in others. There was no mention of their rela-
tionship to Hill. In any event the appropriate balance of competing
interests this time would be struck if defendant publishers were
accorded a privilege defeasible on a showing not of mere negli-
gence but of "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme
departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordi-
narily adhered to by responsible publishers,"95 in brief, gross negli-
gence.
The full scheme is indeed elaborate. We have first public officials,
public figures, and the involuntarily newsworthy. The cases are
now being scaled by three factors: (1) proximity to seditious libel;
(2) assumption of risk of publicity by plaintiff; and (3) possibility
of counterargument to correct falsity. New York Times scores a
plus in all three categories. Butts and Walker score only in the last
two categories, and Hill scores in none of the categories. Accord-
ingly maximum legal protection is given the speech in Times, mini-
mum protection in Hill, and medium-range protection in Butts and
Walker. And this is done by moving the condition of the privilege
down from malice to gross negligence to negligence. And if we
add to the roster Barr v. Matteo 6 on the absolute privilege of high-
level public officials as defendants, we get still a fourth level of
protection.
This was not quite all, however. In the course of the argument
Mr. Justice Harlan turned again to the comparison of communica-
tion to other worthwhile activities in the society. New York Times
being inapposite, "we are prompted, therefore, to seek guidance
from the rules of liability which prevail in our society with respect
to compensation of persons injured by the improper performance
of a legitimate activity by another. Under these rules a departure
from the kind of care society may expect from a reasonable man
performing such activity leaves the actor open to judicial shifting
of loss."'g7
This, then, was the Harlan position. In contrast to the stark sim-
94 388 U.S. at 155. 96 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
a5 Ibid. 97 388 U.S. at 154.
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plicity of the Black and Douglas absolute privilege, it offers mo-
mentarily a refreshingly elaborate edifice of privileges. In the end
the thesis was built on two lines of analysis. First, an insistence that
the Times privilege should be restricted to the quite special facts
of Times and that a reliance on a close calculus of competing in-
terests and risks was needed to work out privileges for other situa-
tions. Second, a simple but forceful challenge to the proposition
that the press needs to be distinguished from other useful services
in terms of criteria for liability. Why, he demanded, could not
publishers, too, be required to act like reasonable men?
For a moment, but only for a moment, the scheme carries the
promise of an original rethinking of the problems of free speech.
The cardinal difficulty is that it appears to lack constitutional di-
mensions. It makes at a constitutional level more discriminations
than two centuries of tort law has worked out at the common-law
level! If policies are to be weighed on scales this exquisite, surely
it is the function of the legislature to do the weighing. Is the differ-
ence between "reckless disregard" of Times and the gross negli-
gence of Butts and Walker a constitutional difference? Moreover
there is perhaps a special embarrassment in this for Mr. Justice
Harlan. In the obscenity cases he opted for a time for a "two tier"
view of the First Amendment, arguing that it applied less stringent-
ly to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment than it did to
the federal government in its own right.98 But if the states are to
be left any discretion in these matters, must they not be left the
very judgments Mr. Justice Harlan would here take away from
them?
There is a kindred difficulty. The scheme rests to a surprising
degree on sociological guesses lightly made. How free and robust
is the New York press? How hardened are public officials to irre-
sponsible publicity? Do they knowingly assume these risks? What
are the relative possibilities for counterargument in the various situ-
ations? If we are to deal in conjectures and rough guesses of this
sort about human behavior, is it not again the task of the legislature
and not the Court to do the guessing? Or, at least, the business of
the states?
The more one contemplates the scheme the less secure it seems.
It is a doubtful reading of New York Times to see it resting so
98 See Kalven, supra note 40, at 21-23.
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heavily on a concern with counterargument. Indeed the whole dis-
cussion of competition of ideas and counterargument seems to me
misplaced in this context. These are, to be sure, key principles when
we are talking about doctrines and ideas. Here, with Mr. Justice
Brandeis,99 we look to counterargument as the correct remedy for
the mischief of false and pernicious ideas and doctrine. And we
grant an absolute privilege to false doctrine. All this is well under-
stood, widely shared, and invaluable. 100
But these notions sound only the faintest echo when we turn to
false statements of fact about individuals. For centuries it has been
the experience of Anglo-American law that the truth never catches
up with the lie, and it is because it does not that there has been a
law of defamation. I simply do not see how the constitutional pro-
tection in this area can be rested on the assurance that counter-
argument will take the sting out of the falsehoods the law is thereby
permitting. And if this premise is not persuasive, the whole Harlan
edifice tumbles.
Again, there is a special puzzle about the discrimination between
Butts and Walker, and Times. In Butts and Walker the two factors
that set Times apart in Hill are present: there is said to be chance
for counterargument and plaintiffs as public figures could be said
to have assumed the risks of publicity. Yet Times is thought in-
apposite because there are no overtones of seditious libel, a point
Mr. Justice Harlan did not bother to make in Hill. This is of course
a real difference between the cases, but it is not easy to see what
relevance it has for the level of the privilege, unless the implication
is that we are to scale the value of the speech too. But Mr. Justice
Harlan is quite firm that the public interest in this speech "is not
less than that involved in New York Times."'' 1
And still again, if one is to use golden scales, why not consider
the gravity of the comment about the aggrieved individual? Might
we not ask for more care from a man risking the remark that Wally
Butts had been a dishonest athletic director than from a man risking
the apparently innocuous remark that Mr. Hill had heroically come
to the aid of his beleaguered family? Or might we not change the
99 Concurring in Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
100 The classic statement is by Mr. Justice Stewart in Kingsley Pictures v. Regents,
360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959).
101 388 U.S. at 154.
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rank by weighing the fact that the Hill story was merely entertain-
ment whereas the other stories were "serious" news? Not the least
of the troubles with the scaling game is that there are so many ways
to play it. At least this time in his long debate with Mr. Justice
Harlan, Mr. Justice Black seems to be correct: balancing has run
riot.
In many ways the most arresting part of the Harlan argument is
the effort to bring the reasonable man into free speech. It poses a
fresh version of the preferred-position problem. If a service as use-
ful to society as medicine can be subjected to liability for profes-
sional malpractice, why cannot the press be held to a comparable
standard? .02 If the risk of jury judgments under a negligence stand-
ard is not too inhibiting for other useful activity, why is it so undue
a burden on communication? The question is a good one and the
answer is not that we think communication will be inhibited more
than the other activity, but simply that we are less willing to have
it inhibited. It is a special kind of activity in our society. That, in
brief, is what the traditions of the First Amendment are all about-
a special sensitivity to the risks of inhibiting communications activ-
ity and services.
Moreover, Mr. Justice Harlan has not, fortunately, had the cour-
age of his conviction. Although he appeals most fully to the reason-
able man standard in Butts, he is unwilling to use it there and exacts
a privilege defeasible only by gross negligence. Also, in Times itself
he concurred in exacting an even stronger privilege. Why, to repeat
his question, cannot the communication activities in both those cases
survive under the standard we apply to the useful services of
doctors?
Further, the premise that the rules of tort liability that have been
found appropriate for other activity are presumptively appropriate
too for communication activities could lead to some unanticipated
results. It is no longer true, if it ever was, that negligence represents
the single consensus of society regarding the point at which losses
are to be shifted. There is the doctrine of strict liability for extra
hazardous activities enshrined in § 519 of the Restatement of Torts.
102 The press might not oppose the malpractice standard if they could be assured
that, like the doctors, they would be presumed to have met professional standards
unless there was explicit expert testimony that they had not. Given the famous con-
spiracy of silence by the press in reporting libel actions against fellow newspapers,
it would be interesting indeed to hear them testify about each other's professionalism.
267]
HeinOnline  -- 1967 Sup. Ct. Rev. 301 1967
302 THE SUPREME COURT REVIEW
Perhaps more important there is today the explosion of strict liabil-
ity in the field of products liability. In these cases, to put it as Mr.
Justice Harlan has, the society has judged that these useful activ-
ities°3 -excavating for foundations, operating oil wells, extermi-
nating pests, and the manufacturing and distributing of food, auto-
mobiles, knit wear, power tools-would not be unduly burdened
by shifting all losses to them. Would he then follow the tort law
and impose strict liability on communications for the risk of falsity?
It is tempting, although perhaps unfair, to push the logic one step
further. Since communication activity is equated with other useful
activity for purposes of selecting an appropriate rule of liability;
and since in Hill Mr. Justice Harlan finds strict liability an uncon-
stitutional burden on communications, we would appear to get to
the delightful conclusion that the rule of § 519 of the Restatement
of Torts itself is unconstitutional!
The Harlan observations raise, however, a question of genuine
depth not only for the theory of free speech but also for the theory
of tort liability. When we juxtapose communication as a risk-
creating activity alongside all other risk-creating activity, it may
look as though we have selected communication from other useful
activity in the society in order to overprotect it. Or the analogy
may move us in the other direction and it may look as though we
elsewhere have underestimated the inhibiting impact of tort liability,
have seen it clearly only for speech, and therefore have been under-
protecting other activity."0 4
103 Ironically, the special rationale of the Restatement would emphasize how
valuable the extrahazardous activity is to society. Thus, the defendant is not said
to be- negligent in engaging in it, and we do not aim to inhibit him by imposing
liability. See Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 Htav. L. REv.
401 (1959).
104 What is specially arresting, given this moment in the debate about tort theory,
is the evaluation of the impact of liability insurance in the two contexts. It has
become a commonplace of tort talk to argue that insurance eliminates any deterrent
impact of tort liability. See CoNrAx, MORGAN, et al., AUTroMoBmE AccmE CosTs
AND PAYmNTs (1964). There is, however, no intimation in any of the Justices'
opinions that there is such a thing as libel insurance.
For a sample of current tort debate see Kurro & O'CoNiNz=, BASIC Pao rmcnoN
FOR 'rm TRAFFIC VIcrM (1965); Calabresi, Fault, Accidents and the Wonderful
World of Blum and Kalven, 75 YALE LJ. 216 (1965); Blum & Kalven, The Empty
Cabinet of Dr. Calabresi---Auto Accidents and General Deterrence, 34 U. Cm. L.
REv. 239 (1967).
The possibilities are rich indeed. One might build a Calabresi argument for strict
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My appetite for generalization is not up to an effort to unify tort
theory and speech theory. The two traditions are too different. My
preference, in this novel context at least, is to accord to speech and
press "a preferred position" among useful activities or services. In
a profound sense the commitment to free speech is quixotic and
gallant; it is not a matter for prudence. Mr. Justice Brennan cap-
tured the flavor exactly in New York Times when he mentioned
"the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open."' 05 I suspect that, properly viewed, there is
in the world of the First Amendment no place for "the reasonable
prudent man."
So much then for the extremes. It remains to observe what Jus-
tices Brennan and Warren make of the middle position. The logic
of Mr. Justice Brennan in Hill combines a favorite thesis of his
about the dangers of stimulating self-censorship with a thesis sug-
gestive of his two-level approach to obscenity in Roth. In contrast
to the approach of Mr. Justice Harlan, the principal question for
him is the risk of inhibiting what is admittedly speech on matters
of public interest. He is very clear about the gravity of this risk,
under the special facts of the Hill case: 106
We create grave risk of serious impairment of the indispen-
sable service of a free press in a free society, if we saddle the
press with the impossible burden of verifying to a certainty
the facts associated in news articles with a person's name, pic-
ture, or portrait, particularly as related to non-defamatory
matter. Even negligence would be a most elusive standard,
especially when the content of the speech itself affords no
warning of prospective harm to another through falsity.
liability in communications in order to capitalize on general deterrence of com-
munications "accidents," or build a James argument in order to spread the losses
of communications accidents, or, with Mr. Justice Harlan, stick to nineteenth-
century liability for fault theory, or, with Mr. Justice Brennan, limit liability in
effect to intentional torts only, or finally, with Justices Black and Douglas, eliminate
liability altogether.
It should be noted, however, that the proponents of strict liability in tort have
generally been eager to eliminate liability for pain and suffering and to leave such
losses on the victim. Arguably, that is the most relevant tort analogy here. See
KEETON & O'CoNwu , supra; GREEN, T imc VictiMs: TORT LAw AND INsuRANcE
(1958); and BLUA! & KALvEN, PuBLIc LAw PRSPEcrrVEs ON A PRIvATE LAw PROBI.EM
34-36 (1965).
105 376 U.S. at 270. 106 38$ U,S, gt 3$9,
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He then goes on to point up the uncertainty of jury performance
in such cases under a negligence standard, and then to stress the
invitation to the press to censor themselves, and thus not to exercise
their "constitutional guarantees" fully: "Fear of large verdicts in
damage suits for innocent or mere negligent misstatement, even fear
of the expense involved in their defense, must inevitably cause
publishers to 'steer far wider of the unlawful zone.' 107
This then was the answer to the Harlan position. It has the special
virtue of paying some attention to the peculiarity of the grievance
in Hill. And it left the door open just a little for a different response
in Butts and Walker, where the statement carried notice of its risk
on its face.
But having stressed so much in reply to Harlan the dangers of
inhibiting public speech, Brennan still had to answer to Justices
Black and Douglas. The answer, it appears, had already been given
in Garrison v. Louisiana'8 from which he quoted heavily. It turned
on the special disutility of "calculated falsehood" and on the ease
of avoiding it. A publisher does not have to "steer far wider" to
avoid calculated falsehood; hence liability keyed to it does not risk
triggering a chain of self-censorship. Moreover, the calculated false-
hood falls into that bottom drawer of speech which, in the formula
of Chaplinsky, is "no essential part of any exposition of ideas."' 00
We are back once again in the family of Chaplinsky, Beauharnais,110
and Roth."' We have a form of speech which is beneath contempt,
or at least beneath constitutional concern. Calculated falsehood is,
after all, a kind of pornography. And whatever the difficulties of
the two-level theory as applied to alleged obscenity, it does have a
considerable appeal here."2
There emerged then a coherent statement of position nicely
keyed to the concerns of free speech: Speech on matters of public
interest is within the ambit of First Amendment scrutiny. Such
speech remains of public interest and serves a public purpose even
though it will from time to time deal with individuals. There is
danger in exposing such speech to tort actions by aggrieved individ-
107 Ibid. 108 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
1o9 Chaplinsy v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
"io Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
"I Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
112 See Kalven, supra note 40.
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uals because the chance of inadvertent falsity cannot be avoided in
active "robust" communication, and because fear of liability will
engender self-censorship and cause publishers to "steer far wider of
the unlawful zone." To key liability to calculated falsehood, how-
ever, will not engender self-censorship and in any event it is singu-
larly worthless speech." 3
The clarity and coherence of the position as theory are dimmed
somewhat by two circumstances. First the test does not stick to the
narrow and unambiguous criterion of calculated falsehood, as does
the rationale. It expands to embrace "reckless disregard of the
truth," a concept which belongs to the negligence family. Second,
on the record in Hill, Mr. Justice Brennan was willing to remand
for a new trial, meaning that if a jury, properly instructed, were to
find against the defendant publishers, he would have no objection.
There was a point, therefore, to Mr. Justice Black's complaint that
the action of remanding on this record gives a clue to what the test
is to mean in actual operation.
Mr. Justice Brennan had two final observations to add which are
of high interest. Although New York Times had apparently been
applied to reach the decision in Hill, we are expressly told that the
Court got there "not through blind application of New York Times
Co. v. Sullivan, relating solely to libel actions by public officials,""
' 4
but only upon consideration of the specific problem of the New
York privacy statute and private individuals. "Therefore, although
the First Amendment principles pronounced in New York Times
guide our conclusion, we reach that conclusion only by applying
these principles in this discrete context."" 5 I would happily read
this as meaning that New York Times is a seminal case in that it
gave a reading to the First Amendment that can properly guide the
Court in cases not involving libel or public officials. The point pre-
113 In a recent panel discussion Professor Martin Shapiro observed that the final
result of this extension of the Times rule might be a net loss of robust critical speech.
His point was that critics of government or public policy might now be inhibited
from entering public controversy by the risks that as "public figures" they would
forfeit the protection the laws of libel had hitherto given them. Interestingly
enough, this is precisely the counterargument that was unsuccessfully made in
Coleman v. MacLennan, 78 Kan. 711 (1908), against broadening the fair comment
privilege, viz., that good men would be inhibited thereby from seeking public office.
The Supreme Court does not deal with this counterrisk to speech, but I am fairly
sure it would see the balance falling on the other side. In any event, I would.
114 385 U.S. at 390. 115 Id. at 390-91.
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sumably is that we are reasoning by analogy not for the purposes
of tort law but for the purposes of constitutional law.
Mr. Justice Brennan then turned directly to the Harlan position.
He met it not on the merits, but on the grounds that "this is [not]
a libel action."' 16 If it were, some of the Harlan distinctions as
"between the relative opportunities of the public official and private
individual to refute defamatory charge might be germane. And the
additional state interest in the protection of the individual against
damage to his reputation would be involved."" 1 Once again, Mr.
Justice Brennan appeared to be leaving the door open for a different
result when libel of a newsworthy person is the issue, as was to be
the case six months later in Butts and Walker.
When it finally was a question of libel, Mr. Justice Brennan
found the Times standard appropriate after all. He devoted his
opinion in Butts and Walker exclusively to arguing that the instruc-
tions in Butts were not close enough to the standard and that the
case should be sent back for a new trial. It was left, therefore, to the
Chief Justice to carry on the argument for the Times standard.
Chief Justice Warren tackled the job with gusto. First he labeled
the Harlan standard of reportorial malpractice ("extreme departure
from the standards of the investigation and reporting ordinarily
adhered to by responsible publishers") as "an unusual and uncertain
formulation.""' ' He doubted that it could guide a jury of laymen,
Next, in a passage already quoted,119 Chief Justice Warren ar-
gued that under the conditions of modern life there are no relevant
differences between public officials and public figures. Hence he
would have applied the same standard to both. And picking up Mr.
Justice Harlan's emphasis in Hill on the possibilities of counter-
argument, he stated: "surely as a class these 'public figures' have as
ready acccess as 'public officials' to mass media of communication,
both to influence policy and to counter criticism of their views and
activities."'u2 If, then, the possibility of counterargument were the
test, as Mr. Justice Harlan contended, public figures and public
officials are fungible. And, reflecting Mr. Justice Harlan's taste for
nuance, Chief Justice Warren found a subtle difference between
public officials and public figures which moves in the direction of
11O Id. at 390.
117 Ibid. 119 Text supra, at note 57.
118 388 U.S. at 163. 120 388 U.S. at 164.
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giving more protection, if distinctions are to be drawn, to the critic
of the public figure! Unlike officials, public figures are not subject
"to the restraints of the political process."121 This means that society
may have to rely on public opinion as "the only instrument by
which society can attempt to influence their conduct."' 2 2 This again
shows that one trouble with "balancing" is that there are too many
ways to do it.
The Chief Justice then concluded with some words of praise for
the Times standard. It is manageable, "readily stated and under-
stood,"' 23 and moreover reflects a proper balancing of the interests
involved. He stressed that the standard is not so restrictive as to
limit recovery to cases where there is "knowing falsehood"; it in-
cluded, after all, "reckless disregard for the truth."
This is perhaps the fitting moment to pause to marvel at the
pattern of the Court's argument on this issue. The Court was di-
vided 5 to 4 on whether the constitutional standard for the condi-
tional privilege of those who libel public figures is that it be defea-
sible only upon a showing of "reckless disregard for truth" or mere-
ly on a showing of an "extreme departure" from professional news-
paper standards! Further it was understood that the chief signifi-
cance of the standard relates simply to how jury instructions will
be worded. Yet this nuance triggered a major debate in the courts
on the theory of free speech. Nor was this quite all. Perhaps there
is poetic justice in the fact that each side can make a claim to vic-
tory. The Harlan standard, as we noted at the outset, has its Butts;
the Brennan-Warren standard has its Walker!
When, however, we remember that the appearance of victory
for Harlan in Butts is a fluke, occasioned by Warren's vote to save
the verdict for the plaintiff, it is apparent that the Court stands 5
to 4 in favor of the Brennan-Warren standard and hence in favor
of an across-the-board application of New York Times. The deci-
sive precedent on the issue of the standard is therefore Walker-
and behind it New York Times.
What are we to make, in the end, of the Court's disposition to
argue so fiercely over so tiny a difference in jury instructions? Was
Mr. Justice Fortas perhaps the one who really had the matter prop-
erly in focus when he admonished the Court in Hill: 24
121 Ibid. 12 Ibid.
122 Ibid. 124 385 US. at 418.
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But a jury instruction is not abracadabra. It is not a magical
incantation, the slightest deviation from which will break the
spell. Only its poorer examples are formalistic codes recited
by a trial judge to please appellate masters. At its best, it is
simple, rugged communication from trial judge to jury of
ordinary people, entitled to be appraised in terms of its net
effect.
Was he disdaining to join the Court in debate on the merits?125
I have no inside information on why these issues held such ex-
traordinary power to move the Supreme Court. I have no socio-
psychological theories about small group process in the current
Court or about its incapacity to reach consensus. I do have a few
final hunches about what it all might mean, and they are benign.
First, it shows that the free speech issue etched in the sequence
from Times to Butts and Walker of public speech interlaced with
comment on individuals is a new issue never really confronted be-
fore in legal theory about freedom of speech and press. And it is a
surprisingly troublesome issue. Second, it shows once again-and it
is a splendid thing-that all members of this Court care deeply about
free speech values and about their proper handling by law. Only
a concerned Court would have worked so hard on such a problem.
And finally, I think it shows a special respect for the potential of
New York Times as a precedent on the First Amendment. In a
sense the quarrel is over preserving the trademark of the New York
Times case. If it is applied across the board in these cases, it retains
its salience as a key precedent and it gives the Court a touchstone
for the future; if the standard is nibbled away, a promising starting
point for analysis of future problems is wasted. 26
125Yet in Butts he joined Mr. Justice Harlan in the gross negligence standard
against the "reckless disregard" formula" of Warren and New York Times!
126 This is not the place seriously to inventory the intriguing questions left in
the future of New York Times v. Sullivan, but the following at least come quickly
to mind: (1) Whether Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250 (1952), upholding the
constitutionality of group libel laws is still "good law." (2) Whether the Court
will ever re-examine, in light of Times, the rationale it gave in Roth v. United
States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), for the constitutionality of obscenity regulation. (3)
Whether the fact-opinion distinction, on which so much of the common law on
fair comment is based, is to be operative at the constitutional level. That is, is there
an absolute privilege to express opinions, no matter how deliberately unfair, on
public officials and public figures? (4) Will the libel per se controversy (which
relates to whether special damages need be shown where the statement is not
libelous on its face but requires extrinsic facts to spell out the full implication) have
a constitutional dimension? It would indeed be a remarkable step in the growth of
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However we may feel about the almost endless complexity of
the arguments among the individual Justices, it seems to me the
Court in Hill, Butts, and Walker has, as an institution, played its
proper role very well indeed.
the law if the libel per quod rule, which has seemed to many to be simply a technical
error in handling doctrine in the law of defamation, were to acquire status under
the First Amendment as a safeguard for speech. See Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46
VA. L. REv. 839 (1960); Eldridge, The Spurious Rule of Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV.
L. R~v. 733 (1966); Prosser, More Libel Per Quod, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1629 (1966);
and see Afro-American Publishing Co. v. Jaffe, 366 F.2d 649, 660 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
(5) In recent years it has become apparent that the right of privacy encompasses
not only a dignitary tort but also a tort of unfair appropriation, a right of publicity.
Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAnF. L. Ray. 383 (1960). Does Hill carry implications for
such claims when made by public figures? Or will it be compatible with the First
Amendment that public figures be paid the market price for their photos, their
stories, their biographies, as well as for their endorsements? (6) Will there be
further development of the constitutional law on the connection between the
plaintiff and the statement, the so-called "of and concerning" issue of the law of
defamation?
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